
























Social Protection Unit 
Human Development Network 




Social Protection Discussion  Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They present preliminary and 
unpolished results of analysis that are circulated to encourage discussion and comment; citation and the use of such a 
paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this 
paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated 
organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.  
 
For free copies of this paper, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, 
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433 USA. Telephone: (202) 458-5267, Fax: (202) 614-0471, E-mail: 

















































































































Social Safety Net Primer Series 
A Lecture On The Political Economy of 
















The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of 
the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its 
affiliated organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the 
countries they represent. ii 
Social Safety Net Primer Series 
The World Bank Social Safety Nets Primer is intended to provide a practical resource for those engaged in 
the design and implementation of safety net programs around the world. Readers will find information on 
good practices for a variety of types of interventions, country contexts, themes and target groups, as well as 
current thinking of specialists and practitioners on the role of social safety nets in the broader development 
agenda. Primer papers are designed to reflect a high standard of quality as well as a degree of consensus 
among the World Bank safety nets team and general practitioners on good practice and policy. Primer 
topics are initially reviewed by a steering committee composed of both World Bank and outside specialists, 
and draft papers are subject to peer review for quality control. Yet the format of the series is flexible 
enough to reflect important developments in the field in a timely fashion.  
The primer series contributes to the teaching materials covered in the annual Social Safety Nets 
course offered in Washington DC as well as various other Bank-sponsored courses. The Social Safety Nets 
Primer and the annual course are jointly supported by the Social Protection unit of the Human 
Development Network and by the World Bank Institute. The World Bank Institute also offers customized 
regional courses through Distance Learning on a regular basis. 
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the Social Protection Advisory Service; telephone (202) 458-5267; fax (202) 614-0471; email: 
socialprotection@worldbank.org. Copies of related safety nets papers, including the Social Safety Nets 
Primer series, are available in electronic form at www.worldbank.org/safetynets. The website also contains 
translated versions of the papers as they become available. An ambitious translation plan is underway 
(especially for Spanish and French, some in Russian). For more information about WBI courses on social 
safety nets, please visit the website www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialsafetynets.  
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This paper is the written version of a lecture that draws principally on my own research 
on safety nets and on my operational experience with the implementation of safety nets, 
drawing heavily on the crisis safety net programs in Indonesia from 1998 to 2000.  As 
such it provides more views than reviews of the literature on the principal issues in the 
political economy of targeted safety net programs.  Moreover, in keeping with the lecture 
format, the text is followed by a Q&A that clarifies (and perhaps tempers) views put 
perhaps too starkly in the text.  
 
Five major issues are reviewed.  First, the implications of some simple models of 
electoral politics which make the budget allocated to programs endogenous to their 
targeting design highlight the dangers in ignoring political economy.  Second, the 
political economy of “safety  net” versus “safety rope” programs is reviewed.  Third, 
some of the literature on the perception of fairness of the targeting criteria is reviewed.  
Fourth, the issue of local versus central targeting of programs is discussed.  Fifth, the 
political economy of program implementation that considers the fit between program 
targeting and the organizational culture of the implementing organization is considered.   
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During the 1995-96 debate over the federal budget in the USA, the question of 
whether to means test Medicare (a health insurance program for the aged) benefits was 
raised. Representative Charles Rangel, a liberal Democrat who represents Harlem, a 
predominantly African American and poor district, argued against targeting.  As the 
proposal was to trim the benefits of those households with incomes over $200,000 this 
was defending the view that the rich should continue to receive exactly the same benefits 
as the poor. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, a conservative Republican from an 
prosperous Georgia suburb, argued in favor of targeting Medicare benefits.  He argued 
that the rich should receive less generous benefits than the poor.  At first glance, such a 
situation seems a curious political inversion: one politician who regards himself as the 
defender of his poor constituents arguing  in favor of spending on the rich, while a 
politician usually associated with defending the interests of the wealthy arguing against 
spending reaching the rich.  Moreover, such political behavior seems to contradict both 
common sense and a fair bit of economics. Common sense suggests that fewer people 
sharing the pie, means larger slices: means-testing, or targeting, means more for the poor.  
 
So what is it that an experienced politician like Rangel knows that traditional, non-
political models and common sense do not capture?    Why is it often said among 
policymakers that “ programs for the poor are [ budget] poor programs?”   As political 
scientists, politicians and policymakers suspect, the size of the pie is unlikely to be fixed. 
If the budget for redistribution is politically determined, the impact of targeting on the 
poor cannot be determined by a technocratic evaluation of the hypothetical impact of a 
given targeting design alone; it must  account for the effect of changes in the degree of 
targeting on the size of the budget available for redistribution.  It is possible that “more 
for the poor is less for the poor” and that the less well targeted program will deliver 
greater benefits for the poor.  Whether or not this will be the case in any given situation 
depends on the concrete realities of the political economy—which depends on many 
features. 
 
There are three elements of policy design and achievable gains take place at the 
intersection of these elements. 
 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank John Blomquist, Margaret Grosh and Azedine Oureghi for their support in planting 
the seeds of this document—and their patience in waiting for the fruits. Salimah Samji played a large role 
in preparing this report.  I would like to acknowledge and thank my co-authors in the papers this draws 
on—Jonah Gelbach in the theoretical work and Sudarno Sumarto and Asep Suryahadi in the empirical 
work on Indonesia.  Ariel Fiszbein and Philip O'Keefe provided thoughtful peer review. 2 
Figure 1: Three Elements of Policy Design  
 
While the elements of technically sound and administrative feasibility are often 
addressed when designing policy, the  politically supportable aspect is often 
underestimated or not considered at all.  
 
This lecture will therefore focus on the importance of political supportability in 
designing safety net policies—not because it is the only, or even most important issue—
but rather because this lecture has been given as part of an overall course that treats the 
other issues in some detail.   
 




•  Section 1: Models of electoral politics. 
•  Section 2:  Safety ropes vs. safety nets? 
•  Section 3: The role of perceptions of fairness 
•  Section 4: Reconciling central and local control of targeting. 
•  Section 5: The “organizational” politics of implementation.   
                                                 
2 We warn the reader up front that while this paper reviews the literature, the review leans heavily on the 
authors own work, both on the theory (principally with Jonah Gelbach) and on the practice (drawing on the 










Section I:  A simple model of the electoral politics of targeted programs
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In this section, I review models of two types.  The first focuses on “indicator” 
targeting and discusses the basic structure and intuition of targeting models.  The second 
section is a model of more general targeting which illustrates the dangers of ignoring the 
political economy.   
 
I.A.  Indicator targeting  
 
In  less developed countries, policymakers sometimes cannot observe income 
among the poor.    One oft-proposed approach to redistribution is indicator targeting: 
targeting transfers on correlations between income and “indicators” like geography, 
gender or occupation. In a world of scarce resources for redistribution, dialogues like the 
following between a Technocrat Economist working on Design (TED) and a Policymaker 
Anxious about Targeting (PAT) are common: 
 
TED: The current incidence of benefits from expenditures on program X is at best only 
modestly progressive.  If we restrict X spending to the poor, we can reduce poverty and 
save money. 
 
PAT:  But the administrative costs of identifying the poor correctly would be prohibitive, 
and even if we had such information, what about incentive distortions? 
 
TED:  Don’t worry if we can’t observe actual income, we can  find easily observable 
income indicators – like region of residence, economic sector, or ethnic background – 
that we can use to target income transfers to those most likely to need them.  We can still 
do more with less. 
 
PAT:  But you assume that the budget will remain fixed. If I narrow the incidence by 
concentrating spending on targeted households, I also narrow the program’s constituency. 
In fact, the ultimate outcome will be further cuts in the budget that wipe out any 
efficiency-related gains in poverty reductions from targeting.  Even with a larger share of 
spending going to the poor, the absolute magnitude will fall sufficiently to make the poor 
worse off. 
 
Who is right, TED or PAT?  
 
The theoretical foundation for the technocrat economist’s argument  is 
straightforward and impeccable.    Indicator targeting is possible whenever some 
observable characteristic related to income is available to determine who will receive 
transfers. Indicator targeting is attractive for two reasons.  First, targeting on observable 
characteristics avoids incentive problems that arise when transfers are conditioned on 
outcomes like income or employment
4.  Second, incomes in developing countries are 
administratively unobservable, especially for the poor. 
                                                 
3 This section draws heavily on Gelbach and Pritchett (2000) and Gelbach and Pritchett (2002).  
4 Akerlof (1978) was an early paper on the theory of indicator targeting and refers to this as “tagging”. 4 
 
But the policymaker’s objections to the technocrat economist may have merit. 
The possibility that targeting transfers may affect their magnitude is not lost to 
economists, and concerns regarding political viability are frequently registered in 
discussions of the expected gains from targeting
5. 
 
Gelbach and Pritchett (2000) build a simple model with four features. 
 
First, there are three income groups: poor, middle and rich.  There is an indicator 
that is correlated with poverty that can be used to target.  With this target some of the 
poor get the transfer, but so also do some of the middle group, who happen to have the 
same “indicator”—for example, there are middle income people in poor regions.  
“Leakage” is the fraction of the targeted transfer that goes to the middle class.   
 
Second, the model is such that maximizing poverty reduction from a fixed budget 
requires indicator targeting so that, absent political economy considerations, indicator 
targeting would be chosen.   
 
Third, in the model the middle income group has good times and bad times.  The 
political support for redistributive transfer from the middle income group depends on 
their demand for insurance—that is, as with any type of insurance, they view the value to 
them of a redistributive program lies in transferring income from good states to bad states 
(e.g. “unemployment”).   
 
  Fourth, with this model  Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) contrast two possible 
political equilibria with  two types of policymakers.  The first kind of policymaker we 
consider is “sophisticated” in the sense that she takes account of the politically driven 
budgetary endogeneity when choosing how much (if at all) to target the budget.  The 
second kind of policymaker is “ naïve” (as, we believe, is the literature to date): she 
chooses the degree of targeting under the (false) assumption that the budget for 
redistribution is fixed and then seeks to maximize social welfare by targeting the benefits 
to the poor.  
 
When the policymaker takes account of political constraints, she can never do 
worse than when she behaves naively.  The logic of this result is simple: any budget size 
and degree of targeting feasible for the naïve policymaker also are available to the 
sophisticated policymaker, while the converse is  not true.  So the first conclusion is 
obvious, but often ignored: a policymaker who accurately takes into account the reaction 
of voters to targeting can always do better than one who ignores electoral politics—even 
if the policymaker has no intrinsic concern for the middle class.   
                                                 
5 Glewwe (1990) reports that the outcome of the standard approach to indicator targeting, maximizing the 
poverty reduction achieved for a fixed budget, for urban Cote d’Ivoire is to give all the budget to 
households born in the East Forest Region. As Glewwe stresses, this example paints a particular stark 
picture of the fundamental political economy problem inherent in indicator targeting: it would be folly to 
even propose such a scheme to a policymaker, in spite of its apparent technocratic merits. 
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 The second result in this simple model is that leakage is not necessarily bad for 
the poor—even from the point of view which considers exclusively the welfare of the 
poor there can be either “too much” or “too little” leakage.  If one begins where leakage 
is “small” so that middle income agents are sufficiently unlikely to receive the targeted 
transfer
6, a shift towards more targeting of transfers can actually reduce the political 
support for the program enough to reduce the equilibrium welfare of the poor.  So the 
poor are worse off from “better” targeting that reduces leakage. A leakier bucket may be 
better for redistribution of the poor. 
 
But this result is not universal.  If leakage is large so that middle income agents 
are very likely to receive the targeted transfer, then there is always some positive amount 
of targeting that will increase poor agents’ utility in political equilibrium.  
 
  The main point of this model is that, while “leakage” is often discussed as if one 
wanted to eliminate it altogether, it is easy to construct models that explicitly bring in 
considerations of political economy  in which  even from the point of view of the poor 
more leakage is better.   
 
I.B.  Electoral politics and targeting 
 
Standard economic analysis suggests that when the budget for redistribution is 
fixed, income transfers should be targeted to (i.e. means-tested for) those most in need. A 
large literature has considered informational constraints, incentive compatibility, and 
efficiency losses, but some degree of targeting is generally found to be optimal in the 
models examined.
7    However, both political scientists and economists long have 
recognized the possibility that targeting might undermine political support for 
redistribution.  
 
Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) formalize this recognition, developing a simple 
economy in which both non-targeted (universally received) and targeted transfers are 
available for use by the policymaker.  When the budget can be taken as fixed, full use of 
the targeted transfer is optimal.  However, when we allow the budget to be determined 
through majority voting (with the policymaker choosing the share of the budget to be 
spent on each type of transfer), the optimal degree of targeting is zero.  
 
More strikingly, GP show that in this model, if the policymaker consistently 
ignores political considerations, the resulting equilibrium actually minimizes the welfare 
of the poor.  That is, a policymaker who was acting strictly in the interests of the poor and 
took “poverty reduction” as their sole objective but ignored electoral politics would not 
                                                 
6 What is “small” and “sufficiently unlikely” depends on a complex combination of parameters in the 
model.  
7 Examples in a variety of settings include Akerlof (1978), Atkinson (1995), Besley and Kanbur (1990), Diamond and 
Sheshinski (1995), Kremer (1997), Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), Sen (1995), Stern (1982), and Viard (1996). 
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just not do the “optimal” thing for the poor—but would do the “pessimal” thing for the 
group they were trying to protect.     
 
Even though this second result is particular to this model and a set of assumptions 
-- as i s every other theoretical result – it is worth stressing because this  implies that 
political considerations cannot generally be regarded as simply another small extension 
of standard models.  That is, the literature often approaches the issues as if it were likely 
to be valid to take a sequential approach: first find the technocratically optimal design 
and then consider smallish changes to the design to accommodate politics.  But in this 
model the technocratic approach doesn’t need to be adjusted a bit—in fact it gets it 
exactly wrong and chooses not just not the best, but the worst possible policy.   
 
It is important to note that this result is established in a highly stylized model and 
alternative models could also be used.    But the force of the result, and the simple 
economic logic behind it, suggest that standard models of targeting likely are not robust 
to political considerations in a wider class of settings.  It is worth noting that our model 
does yield optimality of targeting in the special case when political considerations do not 
matter.  Thus it is not the (modeling of the) economy, but rather the polity, that drives our 
results.  As a result, future models and actual policies advocating the use of targeting 
through means-testing should account explicitly for the role of political considerations. 
 
I.B.1.  A model of electoral politics and targeting 
 
This subsection works through the details of one particular model, not so much 
because this particular model is canonical but rather to illustrate the features that any such 
model would have and the fundamental problem that is being modeled.  To illustrate this 
combination of specific and general I present the model in a table, with commentary on 
each feature.  Essentially any “optimal” targeting that takes political economy into 
account must have a model of the “budget response to targeting.”  My apologies to the 
lay reader, but I cannot make this any clearer without doing an injustice to the clear and 
careful theory my co-author Jonah Gelbach created, I think the main points come through 
even for those that do not read “economicsese”. 
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Table 1:  Structure of a simple model of targeting and electoral politics 
Model of GP (2002)  Commentary 
Population has three types of agents: low 
income, middle income and rich  
To be interesting, a political economy model must 
have at least three groups. Two group models (e.g. 
“rich” and “poor”) are both empirically unrealistic, 
but also do not generate interesting electoral 
politics.  Models with a continuum have an infinite 
number of groups.    
There are three types of jobs, each of 
which pays either a low wage, a medium 
wage or a high wage.  An worker may 
work in a job paying less (to avoid taxes) 
but not more than his/her maximum 
marginal product. 
A key issue of targeting is “incentive compatibility” 
so that workers will choose to work at their 
maximum marginal product. If the targeting 
schemes makes middle workers better off when 
“pretending” to be poor or to be unemployed this 
will make the equilibrium costly.  
Poor and middle income agents have 
some probability p of being 
“unemployed” (having zero pre-transfer 
income) and probability q = 1 - p of 
being employed. Rich agents are always 
employed. 
 
This feature introduces uncertainty.  Without 
uncertainty the model hinges exclusively on the 
tension between desire of the middle class to “soak 
the rich” and the efficiency losses from excessive 
taxation. 
Workers in jobs paying the low wage 
(the maximum for the poor) pay no 
taxes; by contrast, jobs paying the 
medium and high wage are taxable at the 
proportional rate .  For heuristic purposes 
one can think of the medium and high as 
the “formal” sector.  
Any model has to build in a structure of taxation.  
This assumption guarantees that the poor always 
favor more taxes while this, plus the above 
assumption that the rich are always employed, 
implies the rich always favor less taxes.  This makes 
the middle group decisive on tax rates.  
Two types of transfers are available:  
universal (each agent receives N dollars) 
and a targeted transfer for all low wage 
workers.   
This creates two types of transfer, untargeted and 
targeted which means some structure of targeting 
has to be assumed.  
 
 
This set up of the economy is specific, but perfectly standard.  The principal task 
in the model is to investigate properties of political equilibria in a “game” played between 
a policymaker and the electorate.  The strategy space for the policymaker is the 
distribution of the budget between universal (N) and targeted transfers, while the strategy 
chose for the electorate is the tax rate (and hence the budget).   
 
We assume that the policymaker chooses a level of targeting, k, defined as the 
proportion of the budget devoted to the targeted transfer.  After the policymaker proposes 
the degree of targeting an election is held to determine the level of taxation.  The model 
requires that an equilibrium tax rate receives support from a majority of the population. 
In the present case, we will assume that no majority is possible without support from at 
least two types of agents.  This assumption about voting powers of the three groups does 
not restrict the population shares, as it is possible that a given type of agent represents 8 




Define t*(k) as the tax rate that solves the middle group’s optimization problem 
over the tax rate for any given level of targeting.  On the other hand, because poor voters 
never pay taxes but always receive transfers, they must favor all tax increases and oppose 
all reductions, no matter what the degree of targeting.  Both middle income and poor 
agents prefer t*(k) over all lower tax rates.  Therefore t*(k) defeats all other tax rates in 
any election requiring support from two or more agent types.    This (plus technical 
assumptions) implies that t*(k) is the majority voting equilibrium given k.  In this case 
the “budget response function”—that is, how the available budget responds to choices of 
targeting – is given by this majority voting equilibrium determined by the preferences of 
the middle-income voter.  
 
A targeting-taxation policy (k, t ) is politically feasible if and only if t = t*(k).  
That is, a policy is politically feasible if and only if, given that the degree of targeting is 
k, the accompanying tax rate is the one that would be chosen through an election of the 
kind just described. 
 
In this model the naïve equilibria (NE) in which the policymaker sets the degree 
of targeting assuming the budget is fixed is full targeting (k=1, 100 percent of the 
targeted transfer, none to the universal transfer). 
9  The only possible NE is (1, t 
*(1)).Therefore, there is a unique NE where all revenues are spent on the targeted transfer 
and none on the universal one. 
 
The sophisticated policymaker recognizes that the politically feasible tax rate will 
depend on the degree of targeting. Because the politically feasible tax rate t* is the 
solution to middle income voters’ first-order condition, it must vary continuously with 
the degree of targeting k.  Any value of k at which this maximum is obtained, k*, is then 
an optimal choice for the sophisticated policymaker, so any policy (k*, t *(k*)) is thus a 
sophisticated equilibrium (SE).  
 
But in this model the utility of both poor and middle-income agents is strictly 
decreasing with the degree of targeting for politically feasible equilibria.  The reason is 
that the budget decrease from increased targeting exceeds the increase in the share of the 
budget going to the targeted households.
10    
 
In this model full targeting would be optimal if the budget could be taken as fixed. 
The intuition here is simple: when the budget is fixed, increasing the degree of targeting 
                                                 
8 But this is very restrictive about the types of political situations being modeled.  It may well be that the 
rich are sufficiently politically powerful they need no support and hence they are decisive.  Alternatively, 
the middle group could require no support from rich or poor.  Assuming that at least two groups need to 
agree simply makes the voting interesting.  
9 Because of the formal sector work constraint, “full targeting” may not mean setting k = 1, i.e. spending all 
revenues on targeted transfers. Except at very low tax rates, doing so would lead at least some agents to 
forgo formal sector work. 
10 By contrast, the opposite is true for the own-utility of rich agents. 9 
amounts to reallocating consumption from rich and employed middle class agents to poor 
and unemployed agents.    Since this process contracts the income distribution while 
maintaining the mean level of income, it must increase the integral of utilities (under the 
assumption that the marginal utility of income decreases as income increases).  However, 
when the budget is determined by majority voting, the equilibrium tax rate  and, 
consequently the total budget fall sharply enough that transfers to poor and unemployed 
agents  actually decrease  with a rise  targeting.    Thus any increase  in the degree of 
targeting induces a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution, reducing social 
welfare.  
 
  While the details of the model are complex the intuition is simple.  The “naïve but 
altruistic” policymakers attempt to maximize the welfare of the poor by choosing k.  If 
they assume in this maximization that the budget is fixed –  in  Figure 2, this implies 
horizontal  – then they will always push to maximize targeting (since, as with any 
optimization, they are attempting to find a tangency of the utility of the poor and the 
budget set and this will push them into a “corner” solution at the extreme of k=1).   
 
  The key insight is that in a political situation it would be extraordinary if the 
budget set were in fact fixed.   If the “true” budget set is not horizontal, then acting as if it 
is cannot possibly lead to the true optimum degree of targeting.  In the particular case 
illustrated in Figure 2 where the true budget set that takes into account the electorate’s 
response to targeting, the “naïve” equilibrium leads to a zero budget and hence is the 
worse outcome for the poor among the politically feasible possibilities.  In fact, choosing 
zero targeting (k=0) and devoting all of the budget to the uniform transfer would produce 
higher utility for the poor than would full targeting.   
   
Figure 2:  A graphical presentation of the model of targeting and electoral politics 
 
Degree of Targeting (k) 




t*(k)—“true” budget constraint 
Budget fixed w.r.t. k 
Utility of the poor, increasing 
in B and k 
t*(k=0) 10 
 
Reliance for policy advice on a literature that takes budgets as fixed has to be 
based on the notion that accounting for politics introduces only a small change to the 
policy environment.  Yet we have constructed a plausible model that stands on its head 
the conventional wisdom regarding the optimal targeting.    Where the conventional 
approach is to take the budget as fixed and maximize social welfare with respect to the 
degree of targeting, we show that this procedure minimizes social welfare in a political 
equilibrium.  Where conventional wisdom suggests that at least some targeting should be 
used, we show that social welfare is maximized in political equilibrium only when all 
revenues are spent on universal transfers and none spent on targeted ones.    Where 
conventional wisdom says that targeting should benefit the poor, have ambiguous effects 
on the middle income, and redistribute from the rich, we show that targeting redistributes 
from the poor, makes the middle income worse off, and benefits the rich in political 
equilibrium.  It seems difficult to imagine a more complete reversal of what admittedly 
reasonable, other-things-being-equal analysis would suggest. 
 
But the point is not that this particular simple model is right and other simple 
models are wrong.  The point is that to choose the level of targeting that maximizes the 
utility of the poor requires postulating some relationship between the available budget 
and the degree (and structure) of targeting chosen.  The assumption that the budget is 
fixed is a possible model, but not a particularly plausible one as there is little theory or 
evidence to support the notion that voters do not care about their own well-being.  There 
are many other models of the shape of the “budget response function” besides ours, but in 
all of them the optimal degree of targeting will be different from the naïve assumption of 
fixed budgets.   
 
Policymakers  should target taking account of  all the constraints  – both 
economical and political – they actually face. 
 
I.C.  Examples and a cautionary tale  
 
It is hard to say what constitutes evidence of a particular model as most (including 
mine) are too simplistic to be taken seriously as adequate accounts.  But there are several 
instances where increased targeting was followed by a reduction in overall benefits. 
 
•  In the mid-1970s  Sri Lanka provided every citizen with a rice ration at 
subsidized prices. At around 5% of GDP, the program’s fiscal cost was felt to 
be unaffordable, so in 1978 the government constituted a reform committee 
with a mandate to cut the budget.  They restricted the ration to the poorest half 
of the population.   In 1979 the rice ration was replaced by a food stamp 
program (so shifted from “in kind” to cash), still intended to be targeted to the 
bottom half of the population.  Since the introduction of targeting, the real 
value of benefits per household among those receiving the transfer has fallen 
to 40 percent of its previous level, from Rs 425 to Rs 170—mainly by erosion 
by inflation.  While it is impossible to say what would have happened to the 
program’s budget had benefits remained universal (since 5 percent of GDP 11 
simply might have been unsustainable) the fiscal cost of the program is now 
just 0.7 percent of GDP.  While overall budgetary pressure may explain part 
of the reduction in the rice ration program’s size, it cannot explain an  82 
percent reduction in the program.  More of the savings came from reductions 
in the magnitude of the transfer rather than from better targeting.  One cannot 
run history in reverse, but would the erosion of the real value by inflation have 
occurred if the program had not become more sharply targeted?   
 
•  In  Colombia, an existing food subsidy was first transformed into a targeted 
food stamp program and was subsequently eliminated.    The distinction 
between the technocratic and political economy approaches is illustrated 
nicely by the World Bank’s (1994) assessment of the Colombian policy shift: 
“Although the program seemed effective and well targeted … it lacked 
political support and was discontinued.”    The analysis here suggests the 
possibility that the program’s loss in political support may have occurred 
because, rather than in spite of, the effectiveness of its targeting.    We 
recognize that this case is only one piece of evidence, and that it is difficult to 
infer causality from simple before-and-after examples.    However, the 
Colombian case is certainly consistent with our predictions. 
 
A cautionary tale.  Support for targeting does not follow simple ideological lines 
with the “left” supporting targeting and the “right” opposed; rather debates on targeting 
find disagreement within both the left and the right.  Those who place high weight on the 
welfare of the poor and believe the budget for redistribution is exogenous should support 
targeting.  But many of the left oppose targeting, which is the right position for those who 
believe that available budget responds strongly to the degree of targeting.  By contrast, 
while those who primarily want a small state and low taxation level may not favor using 
tax and transfer policies to improve the plight of poor groups, such people may still 
support targeting if they believe it will lead to lower budgets (and hence taxes) than 
universal transfers. For instance, Lal (1994) accuses those who oppose targeting as being 
“distributivist”: 
 
“An implicit objective of those who argue against targeting and in favor of 
universal welfare states is distributivist. This is not surprising as they are 
by and large socialists who subscribe to the common end of 
egalitarianism.” 
 
The simple matrix below suggests that actual views of targeting are better 
understood when we consider both ideology and beliefs about the responsiveness of the 
budget.  Both pro-poor technocrats and fiscal conservatives could favor targeting—but 
for very different reasons: the former because they thought the poor would be better off 
(and taxes were (roughly) fixed) and the latter because they thought taxes would be lower 
because the tax cut possible with more targeting was large. 
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Table 2:  Pro-poor technocrats and fiscal conservatives prospective 
    Pro-Poor Technocrat 
(“left” - concerned 
about welfare of 
poor) 
Fiscal Conservative 
(“right” - concerned 






















I.D.  Crisis programs in Indonesia—a first cut 
 
In Indonesia, a crisis “safety nets” program was launched in 1998 in response to 
the deep macro crisis. A variety of targeting mechanisms (administrative, self-selection) 
were used in a variety of programs.  The striking fact is that all of the targeting 
mechanisms achieved surprisingly similar results—much less well targeted than a 
“perfect” transfer but much better targeted than any other component of government 
spending. 
 
In response to the economic, natural, and political crises that enveloped Indonesia 
from August 1997 (beginning of depreciation) to May 1998 (Soeharto resignation), the 
new government announced support for a set of “safety net” (JPS) programs in the July 
1998 budget.  In the face of the economic and political instability and the enormous (and 
growing) social consequences, there were both pragmatic and benign motivations 
for/within the programs. These included: 
 
•  The need for both the new government and the international financial 
institutions and bilateral agencies to be seen to be responding pro-actively to 
the impacts of the crisis in order to sharply differentiate themselves from the 
past. 
•  The desire to  mitigate the impacts of the shock on both households and 
communities.  
•  Many were interested in protecting certain key social services, notably health 
and education.  
•  There were Keynesian motivations to  sustain aggregate demand both 
nationally and locally to halt the collapse in output.  
•  Some wanted to use the crisis and the new program to reorient government 
attention to poverty.  
 
The outcome of the mix of those motivations and the constraints on program 
design imposed by availability of data produced a set of programs with varying targeting 
design.  The magnitude of the budget for the JPS programs was not the result of costing 
out programs or based on any historical baseline but was an amount determined by 13 
macroeconomic, political, and financial  forces with which programs could be designed. 
This meant that programs needed to be targeted. 
 
However, the Indonesian people had never relied to any significant extent on 
government safety net programs prior to the crisis.  The country had neither the economic 
apparatus nor the political mechanisms (nor the inclination) required to deliver large scale 
transfer programs all over the archipelago.
11
   Therefore, establishing crisis programs in 
Indonesia in 1998 did not merely mean expanding an existing net, but casting an entirely 
new one.  
 
The Indonesian government’s approach was to group the JPS effort in five major 
areas. These included: (a) targeted sales of subsidized rice, (b) work creation programs, 
(c) scholarships to students and block grants to schools, (d) targeted health care subsidies, 
and(e) community block grants.  
 
There are two striking facts about the targeting outcomes: 
 
•  Despite exactly the same targeting mechanisms de jure across all districts, the 
targeting outcomes were very different. 
•  Despite different targeting mechanisms across programs (de jure) the targeting 
outcomes across programs were (to first order) the same.   
 
Table 3 shows that, in each program, roughly half the districts have either uniform 
or pro-rich targeting while roughly half had targeting substantially better than a uniform 
transfer.
12  Table 3 reports “targeting ratios” which are the share of the non-poor in the 
SSN program recipients divided by the non-poor’s share of the population.  So if there is 
“perfect” targeting and the non-poor get nothing then TR=0, if benefits went to people 
independently of income then TR=1 because the non-poor’s share is equal to their share 
in the population.  So the aggregate  TR  for the rice program of 0.91 meant that, on 
average the non-poor’s share in the beneficiaries was very near their share of the 
population.  While there was some distribution around this level, 57 per cent of the 





                                                 
11 Before the crisis, Indonesia was one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world, where 
“official” absolute consumption expenditure poverty fell by almost 50 percentage points (from 60 to 11 
percent) between 1970 and 1996. The general poverty strategy of the previous government was: (a) social 
spending, largely focused on the provision of ‘social services’ such as health, family planning,  and 
education, (b) “development” programs that aimed at poverty reduction through increasing productivity 
(such as credit subsidies, left-behind villages program (IDT), etc), (c) some small programs for very limited 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. disabled, orphans), and (d) family and communities providing ‘mutual social 
insurance’ in times of difficulty (there was some subsidized  health care, compulsory social security 
program, and unemployment protection for formal sectoremployees but this was of very limited reach). 
12 This heterogeneity of targeting performance across regions with the same project design is similar to the 
finding in Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002) that across the range of programs they examine there were 
large variations across countries within the same type of program. 14 
Table 3: In Distribution of targeting ratios across the districts of Indonesia 
 
Source:  Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2002. 
Note: TR=fraction of total benefits to the non-poor—“perfect” targeting?TR=0, uniform 
distribution?TR=1 
 
Even though the programs had very different administrative and targeting designs, 
the participation incidence of the various JPS programs appears remarkably similar.  
While there are differences in the targeting indicators (the range of QIII/QI (middle/poor) 
ratios is 20 percentage points (0.59 to 0.79)) the JPS program incidence is similar in two 
respects.  First, when compared the “perfect” targeting (zero leakage to the 80 percent of 
the population which was non-poor) the JPS programs were far from that standard. 
 
Second, the JPS programs were also similar when compared to the benefit 
incidence of other general programs (see figure 2 below).  In particular, the JPS programs 
do substantially better than a uniform transfer, while nearly every other substantial 
component of public expenditure appears as progressive as a uniform transfer (primary 
schooling), worse than uniform (secondary school spending) or much worse (hospitals, 




Source:  Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2002.  
 
 
One possible explanation of the mild (better than uniform but not sharply pro 
poor) and similar expenditure targeting of the JPS programs is that some mix of national 
and local political economy considerations preclude sharp expenditure targeting (Gelbach 
and Pritchett, 2002).  If this is the case, then while some targeting will produce a pro-poor 
distribution of benefits, it is possible there is no program design that would produce a 
substantially more targeted distribution of benefits than that observed.  If this is the case 
then some targeting mechanisms will produce more progressive benefit incidence than no 
targeting, but no de jure targeting design would be able to produce extremely sharp 
targeting (except perhaps for very small programs) as it would be thwarted politically. 
 
On the other hand, many targeted transfer programs enjoy wide popularity. For 
instance, public employment schemes that provide income in exchange for work have 
evoked broad support; the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra, India and the 
public employment programs in Chile in the 1980s are examples. No one believes that all 
targeting is politically non-viable, just that the structure and degree of targeting 





I.E.  Electoral politics:  Long historical view 
 
Before moving on to the next sections, it is worth a final word about the long-
historical view of the evolution of social programs.  Basically the historical evolution in 
OECD countries over the 20
th century has been three trends.  First, rising per capita 
incomes.  Second, expansion of the right to vote to larger and larger fractions of the 
population.  Third, a huge  trend  towards greater tax revenue—devoted principally to 
“social transfers”—which are mostly not very sharply targeted. 
 
Figure 4: Social Transfers as a share of GDP, 1930-1995 
 
Source: Lindert (2004:1:14) 
Note:  There is a break in the data in 1980 
 
 
This raises three points, none of which can be elaborated at length, but are worth 
some consideration. 
 
First, “development” and democratization has in each instance led to an enormous 
expansion in social transfers—with no sign of large scale reversal.  Large social transfers 
have proved enormously popular and — while not every country follows the OECD 
experience in lockstep or linear fashion—it is easy to imagine that the long-term 
trajectory in nearly every developing country will be towards larger and larger, n ot 
smaller and smaller, fractions of GDP devoted to social transfers.  Now, this is not a 
suggestion that countries’ commitments exceed their capacity to generate revenue 
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and lower transfers but higher taxes and higher transfers (with perhaps the exception of 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries).   
 
Second, most of the increase in social transfers is towards broad based programs 
with modest redistribution across individuals—very few of the expenditures are on 
sharply targeted programs.  Most OECD social transfers are either broadly universal 
programs or transfers from  good states to bad states  for the same person  (e.g. health 
insurance, unemployment insurance, old age insurance) rather than narrowly targeted 
redistribution.    
 
Third, as a conceptual issue, if there are large market failures in the market for 
“risk reduction” one can think of much of the social transfers as mainly a “compulsory 
purchase” requirement and the “pure” tax component as correspondingly small.  This 
would go a long ways in explaining why these very large tax/transfers in OECD countries 
are associated with very little in the way of efficiency loss (Lindert 2004).  
 
Section II: Alternative perspective: Safety Ropes vs. Safety Nets (Levels vs. Risk) 
 
The now ubiquitous metaphor of a “social safety net” is, after all, a metaphor not 
a description and the metaphor conflates two distinct objectives in the design of transfer 
programs. One objective might be to minimize a measure of income or expenditure 
poverty.
13
 An alternative objective might be to  mitigate risk — reduce households’ 
vulnerability to the wide variety of potential adverse shocks they could face (e.g., death, 
accident, fire, crop loss, job loss) — whether or not the shocks push households below 
some absolute threshold.  
 
An alternative metaphor is that of a “safety rope” such as used by rock climbers.  
Imagine climbers scaling a sheer cliff face.  One mode of protection would be to place a 
net across the bottom of the cliff so that, no matter how high a climber reached, if they 
were to fall they would fall the distance to the net before reaching any protection—that is 
a “safety net.”  An alternative mode of protection would be to attach a length of rope to 
anchors set into the rock.  This way no matter how high the climber got they would only 
fall from where they were to the length of the rope form the highest anchored piece of 
protection.  This prevents climbers from the catastrophe of hitting the rocks at the bottom 
with the complete loss of the progress made.  
 
II.A.  Volatility of income and vulnerability to poverty—transient and chronic 
 
As has been emphasized in recent literature on the changes in poverty status over 
time (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, 
2000) changes in the average poverty rate mask enormous “churning” as households 
move in and out of poverty.  All of the panel surveys in Indonesia show enormous 
                                                 
13 This general definition of poverty covers any of the class of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measures of 
poverty which adjust for the intensity or depth of poverty and is consistent with either absolute or relative 
poverty lines. 18 
volatility  of households in and out of   poverty  over this period (for the IFLS see 
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle, 1999.  
 
While at least some substantial fraction of the measured changes in household 
consumption reflects the difficulty of measuring expenditures accurately, changes also 
reflect the large shifts in households’ fortunes even over short periods of time — as 
households gain and lose jobs, harvests are good or bad, business goes well or badly. In 
fact, it is probably more accurate to talk of “households experiencing an episode of 
poverty” than of “poor households.”  
 
This volatility creates the demand not just for transfer programs to those whose 
incomes are chronically low (safety nets), but also for informal and formal insurance-like 
mechanisms and programs that would pay off not only when income was absolutely low, 
but also when households experienced negative shocks (safety ropes).
14 
 
If the targeting of social programs is judged exclusively on poverty or benefit 
incidence based on a cross sectional snapshot, then risk mitigation programs benefiting 
households who have suffered large shocks but who are not “poor” may appear to have 
large “leakage” (a type II targeting error, reaching people w ho are not intended 
beneficiaries) when in fact they are simply serving an alternative social objective. 
 
The undifferentiated metaphor of “safety net” can also confuse thinking about the 
political economy of transfer programs.
15
  Government may want to implement “safety 
net” and “safety rope” programs for completely different reasons.
16
 While a “safety net” 
program might be more popular the more effectively it transfers from richer to poorer 
households, a “safety rope” program might cause little net redistribution but be popular 
because it serves an important insurance function in transferring resources from good 
states to bad states. 
 
Designing programs that deal with shocks to income (either at the economy-wide 
or individual level) requires mechanisms that allow individuals to be added to program 
participation dynamically.    This requires either self-selection targeting or “open” 
administrative criteria — that is, the eligibility criteria need to have a mechanism for 
households to be added (and subtracted). 
 
                                                 
14 Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Pritchett (2000). 
15 In OECD countries, the distinction has been used to characterize different “systems”, that is those that 
rely on means testing versus those that provide universal benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin et al., 
1999). 
16 Economists would recommend poverty programs to a hypothetical benign social welfare maximizer if 
the social welfare function was built up from individual (household) utility functions with declining 
marginal utility, in which case a (costless) transfer from rich to poor is not a Pareto improvement but does 
raise social welfare. There is also an argument for poverty programs from an externality in altruism. In 
contrast, the normative case for government involvement in mitigation of risk is based on the argument 
that, if moral hazard and adverse selection are sufficiently large then welfare improving  markets for 
insurance against these risks will not exist (and they will be “too small” in any case). This is potentially the 
case in a wide variety of insurance markets — but particularly affect the market for insurance of incomes. 19 
 
Table 4:  Differences in the economic rationale, positive model, and targeting for 
“safety net” and “safety rope” programs 
  Nets or “levels” 
 
Ropes or “risk” 
 











Benign Social Welfare Function 
 





To Poor (transfer from rich to 
poor people) 
 
To “shocked” (from good 
states of the world to bad 
states) 
Note: “safety net” programs target levels of income/well being and “safety rope” programs target shocks or 
risks to income/well being 
 
II.B.  Empirics of nets and ropes 
 
One way to compare “net” versus “rope” performance is to compare the static and 
dynamic benefit incidence.  For an empirical illustration we return to the Indonesian 
SSN/JPS programs. 
 
One common measure of targeting depends on s tatic participation  incidence 
(usually called “benefit incidence but we only have data on participation as beneficiaries, 
not the magnitude so to be precise this is “participation” not “benefit” incidence).  This is 
the relationship between household’s program participation or receipt of benefits and the 
household’s  level of expenditure.    This is the benefit incidence that is commonly 
displayed  and figure 2 shows the standard “benefit incidence” graphs relating levels 
(quintiles) of incomes/expenditures to the likelihood a household benefited from different 
expenditures.  Graphically the coverage ratio is the height at any given level (or range) of 
expenditures and hence the targeting is the slope (either at a point or over a range, such as 
comparing coverage for different quintiles).  
 
The exact analogy can be made for  dynamic participation incidence as a 
relationship between program participation and changes (absolute or proportionate) in 
consumption expenditures (or income).  
 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between JPS program participation (described in 
the previous section) in December 1998 and the quintiles of the natural log  change in 
household per person expenditures between May 1997 and August 1998.  
 
Unlike static incidence the dynamic incidence is very different across the 
programs. Only for the employment creation programs were households substantially 20 
more likely to participate if they experienced a bad shock to consumption expenditures 
(that is, consumption expenditures fell). 
 
 
Source:  Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2002 
 
Different programs can have different coverage and targeting performances, with 
respect to expenditure levels and shocks.
17
   Hence one program’s incidence graph could 
be steep with respect to expenditures at all levels of shock, flat (non-targeted) with 
respect shocks, or vice versa.  A pure “safety rope” program could be sharply targeted 
with respect to shocks but flat in the expenditures dimension.  Figures 4a and 4b show the 
combined static and dynamic participation incidence for two of the programs: OPK and 
employment creation.  Not surprisingly, the programs using self-selection targeting (labor 
creation)   has enormously better dynamic benefit incidence than the administratively 




•  “static participation incidence” (the relationship between program 
participation and household consumption expenditures) was substantially 
better than a uniform transfer, but substantially worse than perfect targeting, 
and remarkably similar for all of the JPS programs.  This implies that some 
designed targeting produces much better targeting incidence than no targeting, 
but the de jure design is not as critical. 
                                                 
17 The graph of participation incidence including both levels and changes in (natural log) consumption 
expenditure is a three dimensional surface. 
18 This suggests that the screening argument for the use of “workfare” requirements (Besley and Coate, 
992) appears to work well in changes but no in levels. These results contrasting the labor creating schemes 
to other programs are in some ways similar and in some ways different from findings about the public 
employment scheme TRABAJAR in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion 2002, Ravallion 2002b). 
They find that TRABAJAR was much better targeted in static benefit incidence  — 76 percent of 
participants were from households in the bottom quintile — and had much better benefit incidence than 
other “protected” expenditures. 
 21 
 
•  “dynamic participation incidence”  — the relationship between changes in 
consumption expenditures and program participation  — was very different 
among the JPS programs.  The employment creation programs, which relied 
on self-selection targeting, were much more likely to reach those households 
experiencing large shocks to their expenditure than programs based on 
administrative targeting such as subsidized rice sales, scholarships, and health 
subsidies.  This implies that, especially in a crisis, the dynamics of household 
welfare is important and this requires dynamics in targeting, either through 
self-selection (which is very expensive in benefits delivered per program 





Source:  Pritchett, Sumarto and Suryahadi 2002 22 
 
II.C.  Static and dynamic (not marginal and average) 
 
In an important paper Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) stress that, for decisions 
about program expansion, the relevant incidence measure is the marginal not the average 
incidence.  In what they characterize as “early capture” programs, the non-poor are more 
likely to receive benefits than the poor from the beginning of the program.   If this is so 
then marginal incidence will be higher than average incidence.  An example might be 
secondary education in which the richer households are likely to be the first to enroll, so 
at low levels average incidence will be regressive.  However, as schooling moves towards 
universality, the incremental child is likely to be from a poorer household t han the 
average child already enrolled, so the marginal incidence will be more progressive than 
average incidence.  In contrast, with “late” capture, the program is well targeted to the 
poor at low levels of coverage but as the program expands the marginal incidence is 
worse than average and hence targeting falls. 
 
It is understandable that many government programs are “early capture” as richer 
and more informed and powerful households would be the first to gain benefits but that 
expansion would lead to better incidence.
20   But the Indonesian experience with the JPS 
program gives some (weak) indications that “safety net” programs were likely to be “late 
capture” programs — that is, it would be easier to create strong targeting of benefits in 
smallish programs, designed and designated for the poor. 
 
Larger coverage does not lead to either better or worse targeting:  There was no 
general tendency across the programs for marginal incidence to be above, or below, 
average incidence.  This implies that neither small nor large is necessarily beautiful. 
 
But the evolution of static incidence as program participation expands (which is 
sometimes called a program’s “dynamic incidence”)  should not be confused with  the 
sense descried here of program incidence of a program with respect to the changes over 
time in household’s incomes (also called “dynamic incidence”).   Sorry about having two 
names for one thing, but I only got to name one of them.   
 
Section III:  Attitudes/perceptions 
 
  So far the “electoral” politics have evaluation models in which program support 
was determined exclusively by self-interest.  This however is a very limited model and a 
great deal of both electoral support and of implementation for targeted programs depends 
on the attitudes and perceptions about the targeting criteria.  This section discusses briefly 
four criteria that might affect the perception about the “fairness” of a program. 
 
                                                 
 
20  Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) show that even the anti-poverty programs tend to be “early capture” with 
higher marginal than average odds of participation (e.g. the Integrated Rural Development Program and the 
Public Distribution System), although the public works program is better targeted than either and marginal 
and average odds of participation are more similar than for the other two programs.  23 
Fair treatment and framing: horizontal equity.  A fundamental principal of 
fairness in many societies is that “like be treated alike.”  A danger of allowing discretion 
into targeting criteria is that choices are made in which, for whatever reason, persons who 
are similarly situated are treated differently  
 
However, what constitutes “like” categories that deserve similar treatment is often 
hotly contested, as well as the issue of whether more favorable treatment of persons of 
disadvantaged groups are eligible for preferential treatment.  Most people would agree 
that people of different ages can be treated differently but that people of different 
religions should not be (but this needn’t be universal).  Men and women are treated alike 
in some regards but no one questions the equity of programs targeted to women.  One 
hotly contested issue is whether it is fair to have special treatment for members of ethnic 
minorities that are disadvantaged.  
 
One issue in individuals’ attitudes towards targeting is the concept of “framing.”  
Individuals form attitudes at least in part on their perception of social categories.  If the 
perception is that “people like me” do not or (if something were to happen) could not 
benefit from a program, then those individuals will tend not to  support it.   
 
A final issue is attitudes towards the causes of  poverty.  Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) have done work on the political economy of social spending, showing how 
important differences between Americans and Europeans in their perceptions of the 
causes of poverty lead to differences in political support for social transfers.  Crudely put, 
if one perceives poverty to be the result of the lack of effort then large transfers are 
unlikely to be regarded as “fair”, whereas if poverty is perceived to be primarily the result 
of forces beyond the individual’s control (either circumstances of birth or structure of the 
economy) then transfers are more likely to be perceived as legitimate.  
 
Process and administrative fairness.  As  any targeted program depends on 
separating individuals (or localities) into “eligible” and “non-eligible” categories, it is 
important not only that those categories be perceived as “fair” and legitimate in the social 
context but also that there be some mechanism to determine whether the decision was 
correctly taken.  This has two forms. 
 
First, there should be some mechanism of appeal to an authority outside of the 
local administration of the program.  This reassures people that decisions are being taken 
fairly without local prejudice.  
 
Second, a mechanism for updating the eligibility at the request of a claimant is 
often an important part of maintaining the perception of program fairness.  Particularly 
when eligibility changes over time (e.g. people age in or out, or people lose income/assets 
and become eligible or gain income/assets and become ineligible) a process for updating 
eligibility is important.  A dynamic process for updating mitigates some of the risk of 
having static (e.g. level) criteria for eligibility.   
 24 
Effectiveness: do the programs “work”?  A final consideration in the attitudes 
and perceptions that affect the political viability of programs is whether they are 
perceived as “effective.”  This is less an issue in targeting than in overall program design, 
but there are elements of targeting.  In particular, the more stringent the targeting the 
more difficult it is for the program to be effective.  There are many examples.  Suppose a 
job training program only accepts all those who have been unemployed versus on those 
unemployed for more than a year.  Clearly the latter group is more a target for 
intervention—but is also likely to consist of harder cases and hence the success rate is 
likely to be low.  Similarly, pushing micro-credit to be available only to the “poorest of 
the poor” is going to mean the program is reaching segments of the population that are 
simultaneously more important but also more difficult to create success.  This 
consideration needn’t imply moving away from sharp targeting, but the implications of 
managing expectations should be taken into account.  
 
On another note, many are convinced that being able to demonstrate benefits in a 
concrete and credible way—through a truly rigorous, independent and scientifically valid 
evaluation study--was a key element in securing the continuation of  PROGRESA in 
Mexico (with a name change) across a substantial change in government.  
 
A preference for “in-kind” versus cash transfers—even among economists who 
believe fully in the fungibility of in-kind benefits—is often justified by an appeal to the 
perception that “in-kind” transfers are more effective. 
 
Obviously corruption in SSN programs subverts all three of these criteria.  
Corruption is probably more damaging to political support for SSN programs than would 
be equivalent losses in, say, infrastructure construction precisely because it undermines 
sense of fairness, process, and effectiveness.   
 
Section IV:  Local vs. Central 
 
A recent strand of the literature on targeting has examined the possibilities of 
using “communities” to target benefits to households.  The idea is that local communities 
have quite good information on both the level and shocks to households’ welfare, and 
hence,  if  local decision-making structures could be employed to use that local 
knowledge, then targeting could be improved without the high cost of improving 
administrative targeting or self-selection targeting.    However, note the “if” in the 
previous sentence is a very big “if”. 
 
To use the superior local knowledge about conditions, communities must be given 
discretionary power to allocate benefits.  But this discretion could either lead to superior 
targeting  or to elite capture (Platteau 2000, Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000) or to 
community pressures for more “spreading” of the benefits.  
 
  Whether community discretion leads to better or worse targeting depends entirely 
on the interplay between national politics and local politics and the pressures brought to 25 
bear at each level.  There is no “general” theory about this – nor can there be – and little 
empirical evidence.  I briefly discuss three cases on which there has been some empirical 
work: Mexico, Bangladesh, Indonesia.  
 
  Mexico:  Progresa/Oportunidades.  The PROGRESA (now Oportunidades) 
program is the classic example of “top down” targeting design.  The regional allocations 
and the household eligibility within regions are both determined by strict applications of 
a formula (that depends on household demographics and an evaluation of household 
asssets).  One conjectured political economy rationale for the elimination of any local 
discretion was that previous “safety net” programs in Mexico had been plagued by the 
suspicion that they were being used as political patronage (in regional allocations) and to 
reinforce patron-client relationships at the local level.  Therefore eliminating any local 
authority in determining eligibility was perceived as an important element in establishing 
program credibility as a “new” type of social program. 
 
Bangladesh: Food for Education.  Galasso and Ravallion (2002) use data from 
Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program to show that power in community decision 
making clearly affected outcomes.  They show that in this particular instance centralized 
allocations to villages were not particularly pro-poor and therefore any pro-poor element 
in the program was the result of local decisions. 
 
Indonesian JPS.  We examine this issue with the Indonesian JPS with three bits of 
evidence: discussion of the OPK, examining the non-income determinants of program 
receipt, and evidence from the Local Level Institutions study linking individual and 
community social characteristics and program distribution. 
 
OPK distribution at the village. The OPK program was designed to allow the 
eligible households to purchase 20 kgs of rice per household at a subsidized price (1000 
rp/kg while the market was around 3000 rp/kg).  The SUSENAS and 100 Villages Survey 
data indicate unambiguously that the de jure program distribution was not followed. 
While the rice allocated to a village area was (nearly always) based on the number of 
eligible households, almost twice as many households received the rice than if the 
program guidelines had been followed and almost a quarter of households in the richest 
group still receive the program benefits (see the benefit incidence above). 
 
These quantitative findings accord well with anecdotal reports, a s from the 
beginning of the program observers noticed that the local leaders responsible for 
implementation were not adhering to the list of eligible households, but rather were 
distributing the rice amongst a much larger group.    As a result, while each eligible 
household in many cases received lesser amount of rice than stipulated in the program, 
other households, which were not officially eligible, also received an allocation (Tim 
Dampak Krisis SMERU, 2000).    Apparently  the centrally planned administrative 
guidelines  often proved socially unacceptable at the community level (Sumarto and 
Suryahadi, 2002). 
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It is not at all clear whether the deviations at the local level were a “good” or 
“bad” thing.  There are three main arguments made by village heads (kepala desa) to 




•  The official list is not an accurate list of those who are in need as, due to the 
crisis, many households which formerly were not poor are also now in need of 
assistance.  
•  Even if the list were accurate, the distinctions drawn are too fine: the 
differences between those households who are entitled and those who are not 
does not justify one group receiving 10-20 kg of rice while the remainder 
receive nothing.  
•  Village heads and community leaders argue that the targeted distribution of 
this central government benefit is inconsistent with the spirit of community 
solidarity and self-help (gotong royong).  The village heads point out that, if 
everyone is expected to contribute their labor to community projects, then 
everyone should also benefit from the unexpected windfall of assistance from 
the central government. 
 
These arguments raise important questions about the structure of  “optimal 
feasible” targeting: communities may know better than the central government and the 
BKKBN  (acronym for family planning organization)  classification about the best 
distribution of rice within any given community.  Furthermore, local leaders may know 
better what is socially and politically feasible.    Rice that went to “non-eligible” 
households, while inconsistent with the program guidelines was not necessarily mis-
targeting.  Moreover, local social pressures around “fairness” clearly led to more uniform 
distribution, though one with less benefit for the poor. 
 
On the other hand, providing too much discretion, and particularly discretion 
without conditions for adequate local oversight, can lead to abuses.  Olken et al. (2001) 
show that local politics appeared to play some role in the way village heads distribute 
OPK rice. Anecdotal reports exist of local leaders abusing discretion in the OPK and in 
other social programs. 
 
Household demographic and social characteristics and JPS program allocation. 
The 100 Villages Survey, in addition to having multiple rounds, also has information on 
household participation in a variety of social organizations.  We can examine empirically 
whether these social characteristics played a role in program allocations, over and above 
the household’s wealth (as proxied by assets), education, consumption expenditures and 
other characteristics. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting result is the contrast between the JPS programs and 
the “credit”  programs run by the government that channeled resources to specific 
activities.  A person who belonged to the government administrative apparatus was much 
more likely to have gotten credit than a household which  was not.  At the same time, 
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living in a  village in which  other people  participate in the village governance 
organizations reduces the likelihood of receiving credit.  JPS programs do not appear to 
have been “captured” by local governments or their agents. 
 
The implementation of targeting will be influenced by household and community 
characteristics and that influence does not necessarily lead to more “pro-poor” targeting. 
The de jure design can work either to limit these influences or to accommodate them by 
providing explicit local discretion, along with checks on that discretion. 
 
•  Targeting designs of many of the programs were not followed strictly during 
implementation of the programs.    In practice, community and individual 
characteristics — that were de jure irrelevant — played a role in targeting.  In 
the sales of subsidized rice program, community influence led to the program 
going to other than just the eligible individuals.  In other programs, individual 
characteristics appear to have influenced targeting.   This implies that local 
conditions will influence implementation, but communities may well demand 
less sharp targeting than centralized administrative criteria. 
 
•  By not building scope for local discretion into the program design (e.g. by not 
allowing the decisions on rice eligibility to be made in a public village 
meeting) this meant that the de facto decisions were not transparent. 
 
Table 5a lists possible costs and benefits of centralized targeting while table 5b 
lists costs and benefits of decentralized.  
 
Table 5a:  Centralized targeting formula 
Benefits  Risks 
Stronger funding  Criteria perceived unfair/unreasonable 
Avoids “races to the bottom”  Allows little discretion 
Protects local disadvantaged  No internal support locally 
 
Table 5b:  Completely decentralized targeting 
Benefits  Risks 
More responsive to regional differences  Local preferences not benign 
Better monitoring (benchmark)  Local politics less pro poor than national 
Local internal constituencies  Races to the bottom 
  Uncertain funding 
 
 
One possibility is to combine central criteria and local discretion in a “top down – 
bottom up” combination.  The national program could make regional allocations and 
criteria for targeting but which stipulate local processes to be followed, either in making 
the local decisions or in making exceptions to the criteria.  Or, explicit local discretion 
could be built in by specifying proportions of the regional/local availability to be 
allocated according the strict criteria with a certain number left to local discretion. 
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For instance, a scholarship criteria could make allocations to individual schools of  
X scholarships with the stipulation that 90 percent are allocated in a formulaic way while 
10 percent are allocated with local discretion.   
 
Obviously it is important to dictate in the structure of the program the criteria for 
the local processes in terms of the procedures for decision making, the transparency of 
the selected candidates, etc.  
 
Table 5c:  Possible mix of national allocations and local discretion 
Benefits  Risks 
Insists on process but allows local 
knowledge 
Local capture 
Funding  Disconnect with local government 
  No institutional base for sustainability 
 
Vietnam.   Top down: national programs with uniform criteria and implementation 
(poverty Vietnam):  “Vietnam’s spectacular success in reducing poverty took place in the 
absence of a mechanism to measure poverty or target the poor based on international 
standards. The distribution of agricultural land to rural households in the early 1990s, a 
process eminently vulnerable to capture by local elites, was remarkably egalitarian.”
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Current targeting methods in Vietnam include:  Household expenditure, poverty mapping, 
income-based, local classification, self-reporting and wealth ranking.  
 
Box 1 describes the trade-offs between centralized and decentralized targeting 
under discussion in Vietnam today.  
 
Box 1:  Improving Targeting Mechanisms in Vietnam: A Practical Proposal 
The General Statistics Office’s main strength is in estimating poverty levels at very aggregate levels by 
computing poverty rates based on the household-expenditure method.  The Ministry of Labor, Invalids and 
Social Affairs’s strength is in identifying the poor at the local level via local classification of households in 
each thon (a commune that includes several villages).  Some of the challenges of allocating the benefits to 
the neediest include: (1) the exclusion of migrants: what if they have settled in? (2) the exclusion of the non 
deserving poor: why should the children and spouses be penalized for the behavior of those members who 
engage in socially reprehensible behaviors? (3) how do you maintain the prestige of a village chief and 
attract committed and honest citizens to apply for the position? 
 
Combining the strengths of these two institutions would be an effective way to improve targeting.  
However, no one covers the intermediate range (i.e. district level).  Household expenditure surveys would 
require a very large sample to generate credible poverty rates for this level, while the local classification 
which relies on social knowledge would be ineffective if hundreds of households were involved. Poverty 
mapping would be a good candidate, however the mobility of people in Vietnam would change the true 
poverty rates of those in the districts.  Therefore, the construction of poverty maps would need to take 
advantage of both household surveys as well as administrative records on migrants. 
 
Source: Vietnam Developm ent Report 2004, pp 121-123 
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Section V:  Internal and Organizational Politics 
 
A final element of political economy is a subject that practitioners know is 
tremendously important, but on which there is almost no published theory and little 
economics literature—organizational politics.  There are two questions.  First, is the 
question of the politics of the “fit” between the organization responsible for 
implementing a program, its ethos and internal culture.  Second, is the inter-organzational 
politics within governments. 
 
V.A.  Organizational fit 
 
  In his classic book on the behavior of large bureaucracies (Wilson 1989) tells the 
story of  when the U .S. agency responsible for administering Social Security and 
Medicare (medical insurance for the aged) was asked to take on an additional function of 
administering an added “safety net” component of disability insurance, making payments 
to those unable to work.  A naïve view of bureaucracy (that they always want to expand) 
would suggest the head of the agency  would be delighted to take on this new function—
additional budget, additional staff, additional powers. 
 
  But the head of the agency argued strongly against his agency taking on this new 
function.  His argument was that the existing ethos of the organization was of “client 
service” because both Social Security were not seen as “means tested” but rather “tax 
contributory” programs.  He argued that irrespective of actual facts about actuarial 
fairness of pay-as-you-go pension systems citizens felt--and his organization’s employees 
were trained to feel—that these were taxpayers’ contributions being returned to them.  
This allowed them to create an internal culture in which the Social Security beneficiaries 
were the “client” and entitled to good service and decent treatment.  (Wilson argues that, 
in fact, the agency was impressively effective).  The agency head felt that the disability 
“insurance” was a means-tested program which was not viewed as contributory and in 
which there was a fair possibility of fraud as claimants pretended to be disabled when 
they were not.  This would mean the administering agency would have to determine 
eligibility on criteria that could be contested (unlike the rules based formula of Society 
Security) creating an aura of treating claimants as “suspicious” and possible cheats.   
 
  This story illustrates a more general point, which is that  most successful large 
organizations have a clear sense of what it is the organization is about—and usually the 
clearer the better.  This is true in the private sector
23 and public sector (Wilson 1989).  If 
either the substance or the very act of targeting is inconsistent with the culture of the 
organization being asked to take on the task, there will be problems.   
 
  Two examples from Indonesia illustrate the point. 
 
  Table 6 shows the coverage of the poor of various programs, all of which were 
launched in July-August of 1998.  What is striking is that six months later half of all 
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households in Indonesia were receiving subsidized rice
24.  This is just astoundingly 
successful scaling up.  In contrast, no other program was reaching more than 12 percent 
of the relevant population. This, at least in part, is due to differences in program fit with 
organizational culture.   
 
  The rice program was administered by the existing logistics agency, BULOG, 
which had a long-standing responsibility to price stabilization which involved the 
purchase, transport, and sale of rice (among other commodities).  So their “ mission 
statement” (if they were to have one) would be “We move rice.”  The program design 
called for BULOG to sell to each village once a month the quantity of rice stipulated by 
the targeting formula.  The rice was available at the sub-district BULOG warehouse and 
villages had to transport f rom there to the village.  The targeting of the program to the 
households was enforced (or not ) by the village heads.  Therefore, while in previous 
times BULOG had moved rice for price stabilization now it was being asked to move rice 
for Safety Net purposes.  This was perfectly consistent with existing organizational 
structures and practices and hence a great fit. 
 
  In contrast, the public works ministry was asked to create labor-intensive 
employment programs.  But after months and months of working with them it was very 
difficult for them to propose and implement a SSN program.  By the time the revised 
program was begun, the  crisis was nearly over.  This was in part because their 
organizational mantra was “we build stuff.”  That is, their prized output was stuff.  
Asking them to take on a task in which the primary purpose was employing unskilled 
labor at low wages – with building stuff only a secondary objective – was too much for 
them.  They continually resisted wages low enough to have adequate self-selection 
because they feared they could not attract sufficiently skilled labor and they  resisted 
“labor intensive” designs because they were not attractive from an engineer’s criteria of 
design.  So, after a brief spurt of activity the “labor intensive” programs (in which, in 
retrospect, they were providing an effective “safety rope”) were phased out due to 
disagreements between the Ministry of Public Works and the  World Bank on SSN 
program design.   
 
Table 6:  Coverage of the poor in the Indonesian crisis safety net programs as of 
February 1999. 
Program  Quintile I  coverage 
Subsidized Rice  52.64 
Employment Creation  8.31 
Primary Scholarship  5.80 
Lower Secondary Scholarship  12.15 
Upper Secondary Scholarship  5.40 
Used Health Card  10.60 
Source:  Pritchett et al. 2002 
 
  There are other examples.  The Indonesian Ministries of (Basic) Education and 
Health may or may not be receptive to “safety net” elements, in part depending on how 
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they interact with the organizational culture.  There was substantial resistance to 
scholarships paid directly to students because the Ministry felt (perhaps not unreasonably) 
that the budget should be devoted to protecting the quality of the schools from budget 
cuts and so rather than being directed to individuals the scholarship budget should be 
devoted to schools.  
 
  This is often a problem when the agency has been a direct service provider and is 
being asked to take an intermediary role (e.g. administer “demand side” transfers like 
scholarships or vouchers).   
 
  A second example is in micro-credit.  The Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) was an 
enormously successful example of expanding credit to small borrowers.  But it did so on 
a commercial basis and the organizational culture was a ‘business” relationship with 
clients.  Hence an attempt by the BRI to reach smaller and poorer borrowers with 
different lending instruments was resisted by the staff as they saw it as not profitable and 
their incentives and ethos focused on profitability (Horn-Welch 2002).   
 
V.B.  Organizational implications 
 
In addition to the politics within organizations there are also the obvious politics 
across organizations in deciding on implementation, which can affect political support. 
 
  The location of “social fund” implementation agencies directly in offices of the 
Presidency in several Latin American countries had both a pragmatic element of “cutting 
through” the existing bureaucracy and a political element of allowing the President to 
take credit for the resulting benefits.  The obvious risks and costs and benefits of the 
allocation of funds on  a  political basis  –  an age-old staple of politics  – have to be 




As noted above, this paper is a background note for a much larger training course 
on Safety Net programs.  Therefore almost everything is either taken for granted 
(justification of poverty focus and targeting) or ignored as there are many important 
problems in the design and implementation.  This note focuses exclusively on the 
political economy of targeted programs and has five major messages. 
 
•  Electoral politics matter and doing the best for the poor requires taking a view 
on the “budget response function”—how will the support for the overall 
budget for transfers depend on the way in which it is targeted.  This is a 
consideration of  the  first order, not a detail to be considered later.  It is 
theoretically possible and in some instances empirically plausible that “more 
for the poor” and more leakage would have been better for the poor.   
•  Targeting needs to be clear on whether a “net” is a better metaphor than a 
“rope” and whether the program is primarily targeting a low  level of well-
being or shocks to well-being. 32 
•  Beyond “self-interest” models of political support, targeting needs to take into 
account perceptions of targeting legitimacy,  including, at a minimum, 
horizontal equity, process fairness, and effectiveness.  
•  The trade-off between central, rules-based eligibility and localized discretion 
needs to be considered carefully.  Almost certainly some mix of each is 
desirable.   
•  Whether a new program should be located in a new organization or in an 
existing Ministry—and if so, where—if often one of the key determinants of 
program success.  Unfortunately, beyond general concern for organizational 
“fit” and the obvious internal governmental politics (everyone wants credit for 
good things) there is little theoretical or empirical guidance. 
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Questions and Answers  
(Collected from previous presentations and discussions, edited) 
 
Question:  In your discussion in Section I of the paper you concentrate on coalitions 
between the poor and the middle class - with the middle class voting on the basis of 
whether they can participate in a program or not.  I would think that there are at least 
some cases where the "rich" would support targeting strongly -- they have an interest in 
addressing poverty for some reason (from altruism, from a distaste of being confronted 
daily from the worst manifestations of poverty, from fear of crime or revolution, from 
belief that a literate, well-fed workforce is in the nation's interest or whatever), but 
because they hold such a large share of the economy's wealth or income and in the most 
taxable forms, will pay for a disproportionate share of the budget.  Would they not then 
favor targeting?  Is their weight in the political process either in coalition with the poor or 
solo not likely to be substantial? 
 
Answer:  Good question.  As the very subtle footnote 8 mentions this model is only a 
model of those situations in which the middle class (defined in the model’s terms) are 
“decisive” in voting.  We make this assumption to make the politics interesting, not 
because it is accurate.  It is perfectly possible that in many countries “the rich” defined as 
those that do pay taxes but never receive targeted benefits are sufficiently in control they 
do not need a coalition with either poor or rich.   Moreover, we have to rule out  a 
“rich/poor” coalition via the structure of our model.   
 
So, yes, there are many situations in which the political economy will lead to more 
targeting if it is possible in a way that improves the well-being of the poor without 
sacrificing political support. One way that I like to think about targeting is that it is a 
“bundled” good.  In our models (with Gelbach) the “bundling” is that the middle class are 
really trying to buy insurance (transfers from their good states into their bad states) and 
this is “bundled” with transfers from them to the poor.  As targeting improves the relative 
price of buying insurance is higher so the middle class buy less (or even zero) and since 
the transfers to the poor are bundled they lose out. 
 
But one could just as easily think of a model in which the motivation for a transfer was 
really geared to benefiting the poor, for instance due to altruism.  In this case the inability 
to distinguish the poor from the non-poor (or to raise complex and heated issues the 
“deserving” poor from those receiving the transfer due to moral hazard—that is, allowing 
the transfer to affect their contribution to the economy) is another form of bundling.  So 
the buy a transfer to the poor I have to buy a certain amount of leakage to the non-poor.  
In this case an improvement in targeting (reducing leakage) leads to the good really being 
purchased being cheaper (since per unit devoted to the transfer more fulfills the 
purchaser’s objectives) and hence they buy more. 
 
So leakier can be better, or leakier can be worse.  The general point is that targeting 
affects the demand for redistribution and we need to think through the politics of that 
together with the design.  Will targeting of the type being proposed increase or decrease 
the polity’s demand for transfers?  34 
 
Question:  In your discussion in Section I of the paper you seem to assume that a 
government/polity can fairly easily raise taxes to support programs that benefit a wide 
swath of the population.  Is that assumption valid for low or l ower middle income 
countries?  Is the "budget response function" severely bounded by tax capacity on the 
upward side in these cases? 
 
Answer.    This question is so hard it requires three answers, none of which I am 
completely confident of because this is one of the hardest areas of all for me.  But the 
basic answer is “yes” for the reasons given in the answer above.  Strictly speaking in our 
model the middle class are the marginal taxpayers.   If “the rich” are the marginal 
taxpayers already then it may be u pward limited already.  But let me give three other 
answers to this question.   
 
First, think of an “earmarked” program of the contributory or  “compulsory purchase” 
type like, say, health insurance.  In this case the question is really one of the scope of the 
compulsory purchase.  If everyone is in the formal sector this is easy.  The question really 
is, how much of a discouragement to formalization is the “taxation” implicit for the 
transfer programs.  This is a very hard question.  The “simple economics of mandated 
benefits” (Larry Summer’s phrase) suggest that if there is no redistributive component 
(e.g. an “actuarily  fair” price is paid ) then mandated benefits are fully offset in wages 
and employers and workers are roughly indifferent in any case, better off if the market 
would not have existed without compulsion.   
 
The problem of course is the cost of imposing the compulsory purchase when a 
significant fraction of the economy is outside of the formal sector.  I really wish I knew 
the answer to that.  As Colombia’s health sector reforms show, this is a very hard 
problem.  
 
Second, there is the jointly related issues of the marginal cost of taxation and the net 
benefit incidence.  That is, the model assumes there is a broad tax based that is roughly 
proportional (e.g. an income tax).  In this case (a) a rise in the tax is feasible, (b) a rise in 
the tax has low distortion/welfare cost, and (c) the net benefit incidence of even a uniform 
transfer is strongly progressive (since the tax is proportional to income and benefit flat).  
But what if the choice is either (a) a very narrow and potentially growth distorting tax 
(e.g. more profit taxes on the formal sector) or a broad but regressive tax (like a sales 
tax).  Here it is the case that the “upside” is much less buoyant for transfers. 
 
Any real consideration of transfers should be tailored to the actual marginal cost of 
funds—which could be very high or could be very low.  And yes, in a low income 
economy it is likely to be high.   
 
But, that is an argument for improving and broadening the tax base in the medium to 
long-run—as happened with the OECD—as much as an argument for narrow targeting in 
the short.  
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Third, remember, this stuff is competing with other expenditures as well as with taxes so 
while in the formal model  “taxes” and “budgets” were synonymous in the real world 
“safety net” programs and social programs of all types are competing with jets for the 
military, embassies abroad, higher salaries for teachers, roads, and subsidies of all kinds.  
All of the time one will see expenditures that have horrible benefit incidence wipe the 
political mat with  “well targeted” programs.  In the Indonesian example the reasonable 
well-targeted safety net programs at the same time billions of dollars were being spent to 
bail out banks (what is the incidence of that you might ask?) and billions of dollars were 
going to fuel subsidies, where we know the incidence is much worse.  So the program 
budget upside is also on revenues.   
 
Question:  In your discussion in Section I of the paper I you assume that the safety net 
programs being discussed are financed with a government's own revenues and thus the 
polity of interest is the nations' voters.  How should we think about cases where the safety 
net programs are wholly or largely funded by international assistance -- either bilateral 
grants or multi-lateral loans?  How does the political preference of the "donor" affect 
things? 
 
Answer.  Here it is clear that the “donor” may have “altruistic” preferences (as the 
stakeholders of donors are always the globally rich)  and hence prefer sharp targeting 
while the “recipient” politics could be one of several types, and the hard part is how to 
distinguish.  One government type is the rich/altruistic government above in which case 
targeting is happy.  Another type is a patromonalist state in which transfers are leaky in 
the worse sense—not only do they not go to the poor, they go explicitly to finance 
political supporters/”clients” etc.  This is the worst of all worlds as it both reduces the 
share to the poor and it decreases the typical taxpayers willingness to pay.  In this case 
the donor will fight for better targeted transfers based on criteria that are open, 
transparent, related to need, etc. and it will be good if more targeting can be achieved. 
 
I of course emphasized the hard case.  It could be that the donor, to satisfy its 
stakeholders, pushes for greater targeting even though in the domestic political economy 
that will reduced total domestically available budget.  That is a bad thing.   
 
The impossible question for you, dear reader, is what situation is the country you are 
working on in?  Is pushing for greater targeting on the side of angels because the money 
will come out of patronage or on the side of Newt because it will reduced support for 
otherwise unobjectionable public sector transfers?  Only an analysis of the concrete 
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